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sparked strong interest among social scientists (e.g.,
Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002; Gilbert, Lieberman,
Morewedge, & Wilson, 2004; Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson,
Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Loewenstein & Schkade,
1999). Overall, the research converges to suggest that
people are inaccurate in predicting their affective reac-
tions to future events (e.g., Buehler & McFarland,
2001; Sanna & Schwarz, 2004; Wilson & Gilbert,
2003). They grossly overestimate the intensity and dura-
tion of their affective reactions to the focal event
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Although extant research
leaves little doubt that affective forecasts are inaccurate,
we argue that forecasting accuracy will vary over time.
Two aspects of time appear especially important for
forecasting accuracy. Both the time course of affective
reactions and the amount of time between forecasts and
the focal event, specifically temporal distance may affect
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Using extensive diary data from people taking their dri-
ver’s license exam, the authors investigated the role of
time in affective forecasting accuracy. Replicating exist-
ing findings, participants grossly overestimated the inten-
sity and duration of their negative affect after failure and
only slightly overestimated the intensity and duration of
their positive affect after success. Extending existing find-
ings, participants accurately predicted a decrease of their
affective reactions over time but underestimated the
speed with which this decrease would occur. In addition,
they showed greater forecasting accuracy for positive
affect than negative affect when the exam was distant and
greater forecasting accuracy for negative affect than pos-
itive affect when the exam was close. The motivational
processes underlying these findings are being discussed.
Keywords: affective experiences; affective forecasting; temporal
biases
Predicting how we will feel in response to futureevents is a central component of our self-knowledge.
Small and big decisions—whether to drink another beer,
whom to marry, whether to have children—often
depend on our predictions about how pleasant or
unpleasant these events would make us feel, specifically
our affective forecasts (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). The
accuracy of these affective forecasts has recently
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on November 28, 2010psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
forecasting accuracy. By providing participants with an
opportunity to forecast their affective reactions on sev-
eral days before the focal event and by following their
affective experiences for several days after the event had
happened, we compared people’s affective forecasts and
their affective experiences over time. This approach
allows us to recognize time as an important determinant
of forecasting accuracy through the investigation of
both the time course of affective forecasts and experi-
ences and the influence of temporal distance to the focal
event on forecasting accuracy.
Temporal Influences on Forecasting Accuracy
Research on forecasting accuracy compares people’s
predictions about how they will feel in response to an
event in the future with their actual affective experi-
ences (Buehler & McFarland, 2001; Gilbert et al., 1998;
Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000).
Typically, this research takes what we would like to call
a time slice approach. It computes the difference
between an affective forecast made at one point in time
before a focal event takes place and an assessment of the
affective experience at one (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998) or
several points in time after the focal event has taken
place (e.g., Wilson et al., 2000).
Two basic findings have emerged from this
approach. First, people overestimate the intensity and
duration of their affective reactions to a variety of focal
events, committing the impact bias (Wilson & Gilbert,
2003). Second, the impact bias shows a positive-
negative asymmetry, because it is much more pro-
nounced for negative events than positive events (e.g.,
Buehler & McFarland, 2001; Gilbert et al., 1998).
Often the impact bias is taken as an indicator that
people are poor predictors of their affective reaction and
are subject to various errors (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).
To illustrate, people imagine the focal event in isolation
and fail to consider mitigating circumstances that may
change the course of their affective reaction after the
event has taken place (Dunn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2003;
Wilson et al., 2000; for overviews see Loewenstein &
Schkade, 1999; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Independent
of the type of error people make, we suggest that the
time slice approach tends to underline discrepancies
between forecasts and experiences thereby overempha-
sizing bias and inaccuracies in affective forecasting.
Time course of the affective experience. The time
slice approach mostly uses mean differences between
the affective forecast and affective experiences. These
mean differences capture, by definition, linear relation-
ships or—where possible—linear trends (e.g., Sanna &
Schwarz, 2004). It remains silent on the speed with
which affect changes over time. Two models of speed of
change can be conceived. A linear model of affective
change implies that changes in affect start at a certain
level of intensity and then increase or decrease at a rel-
atively constant rate over the time period of interest.
Recent models on affect progression and experience
(e.g., Chow, Ram, Boker, Fujita, & Clore, 2005;
Larsen, 2000) challenge such a linear conceptualization
of affective change. To illustrate, affect may begin at a
high level of intensity and may then decrease rapidly
over several points of time before tapering off to an
asymptote at later points of time. A quadratic model
captures these nonlinear changes and considers that
affect changes at different rates over the time period of
interest. Hence, a quadratic model allows us to explic-
itly consider the speed of change in affective reactions.
How are quadratic models in affective experiences
related to forecasting accuracy? People have naïve theo-
ries about how time influences their affective experi-
ences (cf. Ross, 1989). The best illustration of such a
theory is the proverb time heals all wounds, which indi-
cates that affective experiences fade over time and that
one eventually gets over physical and psychological
injuries. When forecasting their affective reactions to an
important event, people may invoke these theories to
guide their predictions of change in affect intensity and
duration over time (e.g., Igou, 2004). We propose that
people’s theories about affective changes over time
reflect the assumption that affect changes at a constant
rate over a particular period of time. This suggestion
receives support from various studies showing that
people fail to consider mitigating circumstances in their
affective forecasts (see Gilbert, Gill, et al., 2002;
Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999). They focus too much
on the event and its outcome and not enough on the
consequences this event might bring about (Wilson
et al., 2000). By failing to consider these consequences
and mitigating circumstances, people are likely to over-
estimate the duration of their affective experience (i.e.,
the linear trend) and to underestimate the speed with
which their affective experience will decrease (i.e., the
quadratic trend).
In contrast to the view that emphasizes inaccuracy of
affective forecasts, then, we adopt a more optimistic
view that acknowledges that under certain conditions
affective forecasts may be accurate. Specifically, we
argue that people’s theories about affect progression are
inaccurate, not because people are generally inaccurate,
but because people fail to consider quadratic changes in
affective experiences when making affective forecasts.
Thus, regarding temporal changes in affect progression,
we predict that people make linear forecasts of their
affective reactions to a focal event. People’s fore-
casts should fail to consider quadratic changes in affect
Finkenauer et al. / INVESTIGATING TIME IN FORECASTING 1153
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progression that should render their forecasts inaccu-
rate. Such a suggestion cannot be tested with the time
slice approach (for an exception see Wilson et al., 2000)
but requires multiple assessments of affective experi-
ences after the event has taken place.
Temporal distance to the focal event. Dynamic
changes in affect occur not only after an event has taken
place but also prior to it. Existing research shows that
preceding an event, people are motivated to activate psy-
chological strategies that may help to soften the blow if
necessary (e.g., Shepperd, Findley-Klein, Kwavnick,
Walker, & Perez, 2000). The time slice approach does
not allow us to consider how forecasts vary as a function
of temporal proximity to the focal event because it typi-
cally assesses forecasts only once before the focal event
takes place (for an exception see Van Boven, Loewenstein,
& Dunning, 2005).
Traditionally it is assumed that people are motivated
to approach pleasure and success and to avoid pain and
failure (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998; Gray, 1982).
More recently, research draws attention to the fact, that
under certain conditions, people may be inclined to
approach negative feelings and avoid positive feelings
(Erber & Erber, 2001; Gohm, 2003; Loewenstein,
2006; Västfjäll & Gärling, 2006). Rather than uncondi-
tionally pursuing pleasure, this research suggests that
people are implicitly aware of the fact that emotions
affect behavior and information processing. Accordingly,
they regulate their affect to enhance their performance
in a given situation (Gohm, 2003).
People have implicit theories about how emotions
affect their behavior and everyday functioning. They
attenuate both positive and negative emotions to avoid
detrimental effects of emotions on social interaction
(Erber, Wegner, & Therriault, 1996), motivation (Erber
& Erber, 1994; Erber & Tesser, 1992), and perfor-
mance (Therriault, Erber, & Oktela, 1996). To illus-
trate, in a study by Erber, Erber, and Poe (2004),
participants who anticipated a high-stake task tried to
attain negative feelings and reduce positive feelings to
help them succeed in the important task. Participants
who anticipated a low-stake task did not regulate their
feelings. Erber et al. (2004) took these results to suggest
that people believe that their feelings may influence
their future performance. Consequently, people strate-
gically regulate their feelings to ensure successful coping
with demanding situations.
The attenuation of feelings may serve a variety of
functions, including helping people to sustain motiva-
tion or promote realistic thinking, if it is believed to lead
to benefits and gains in the long run (cf., Parrott, 2002).
For example, people may up-regulate feelings of
anxiety or fear prior to an important exam to motivate
themselves to work harder or to resist distracting temp-
tations. For similar reasons, people may down-regulate
feelings of optimism or happiness. So, rather than being
motivated by positive feelings, people seem to be moti-
vated by positive outcomes (Martin & Davies, 1998)
and they are willing to down-regulate positive feelings
and up-regulate negative feelings to achieve these
outcomes.
For forecasting accuracy, these findings give rise to
an exciting but counterintuitive prediction. People
should be more accurate at forecasting their positive
affect than their negative affect before the event. Recall
that forecasting accuracy indicates that people accu-
rately predict not only that their affect will decrease
(i.e., linear trend) but, more important, they accurately
predict the speed with which their affect will decrease
(i.e., quadratic trend). So, forecasting accuracy actually
is an indicator that people are aware that their affect
does not linger. Forecasting inaccuracy is an indicator
that people accurately predict that their affect will
decrease (i.e., linear trend) while they underestimate the
speed with which this occurs thereby overestimating
the intensity and duration of their affective reaction to
the future event. Paralleling affect attenuation research,
then, we expect that prior to an important event, people
accurately predict the intensity and duration of their
positive affect (i.e., forecasts show both linear and qua-
dratic trends) but inaccurately predict the intensity of
their negative affect (i.e., forecasts show the linear
trend). Put differently, people should correctly predict
the speed with which their positive affect fades and
overestimate the duration of their negative affect.
This suggestion should be moderated by the tempo-
ral distance to the focal event. Dynamic shifts in affect
occur as events or outcomes draw nearer (e.g., Shepperd
et al., 2000). The literature on coping suggests that
people are motivated to activate psychological strategies
that may help to minimize the aversive impact of poten-
tial setbacks, failures, or tragedies (e.g., Shepperd &
McNulty, 2002). These affect regulation processes vary
as a function of temporal distance. To illustrate, people
lower their expectations regarding the outcome of an
event as the event draws nearer to brace for loss in case
the event turns out to be negative (e.g., Shepperd et al.,
2000; van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & van der Pligt, 2003).
This pattern seems adaptive. As long as people believe
that they can still influence the outcome of a future
event, they may be motivated to try harder to pursue
their goals and achieve a positive outcome. However, as
the event draws nearer and as their influence on the out-
come may decrease, people may be motivated to try to
minimize the event’s aversive impact. For example,
before an important exam, people may try to ensure
passing by working hard. When the exam is imminent,
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however, that is, when they cannot do anything to
enhance their chances for success anymore, they should
put strategies in motion to lessen the impact of a poten-
tial failure. These motivational changes across temporal
distance to the event should be reflected in affective
forecasts.
Specifically, people should more accurately predict
the intensity and duration of their positive affect when
the temporal distance to the focal event is great,
whereas they should inaccurately predict (i.e., overesti-
mate) their negative affect (see above). When the event
is close, however, the pattern of forecasting accuracy
should reverse such that people should more accurately
predict their negative affect than their positive affect.
Accuracy for negative affect, when the event is close,
indicates that people accurately forecast that the nega-
tive affect will fade and—more important—that it will
fade fast. Inaccuracy for positive affect when the event
is close implies that people overestimate the intensity
and duration of their positive affect. In short, we predict
that forecasting accuracy for positive affect should
decrease as the event draws nearer whereas forecasting
accuracy for negative affect should increase.
Overview of the Study
The present study tested the following hypotheses.
First, replicating findings based on the time slice para-
digm, people should show the impact bias. The impact
bias should be more pronounced for negative affect
than for positive affect (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998).
Second, regarding the time course of their affective
experiences, people’s affective forecasts should accu-
rately reflect linear changes in their affective experiences
following the focal event. Their affective forecasts
should be inaccurate in reflecting quadratic changes in
affect experience following the focal event, however.
Third, people’s forecasting accuracy should vary as a
function of temporal distance to the focal event.
Specifically, accuracy for positive affect should be
greater when the focal event is distant and should
decrease as the event approaches. Accuracy for negative
affect should be lower when the event is distant and
increase as the focal event draws closer.
To investigate these hypotheses and circumvent short-
comings of the time slice paradigm, we conducted a lon-
gitudinal daily diary study among people taking their
driving examination in the Netherlands. A Dutch driver’s
license is issued after passing a written test and a driving
test at the Dutch Driving License Organisation (Centraal
Bureau Rijvaardigheidsbewijzen or CBR). The average
costs for the license amount to €1,710 or about 2,000
U.S. dollars (CBR, 2004; Consumentenbond, 2005) and is
generally considered an important and self-relevant event.
Using an experience-sampling device, participants
made affective forecasts regarding their driving exam
outcome on each day for five consecutive days before
their exam took place (–D5, –D4, –D3, –D2, –D1).
They rated their affective experiences on the day of their
exam after the exam had taken place (D-Day), and on
five consecutive days following their exam (+D1, +D2,
+D3, +D4, +D5). Given that participants could fail or
pass the examination, we were able to investigate all
hypotheses for both positive affect (i.e., happiness) and
negative affect (i.e., disappointment).
Because our study combined both several assess-
ments of affective forecasts before the focal event took
place and several assessments of affective experiences
after the event took place, it was uniquely positioned
to address questions regarding the role of time in
affective forecasting that have remained unanswered
by studies using the time slice paradigm. Studies using
between-subjects designs (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998)
compared affective forecasts and experiences but do
not allow us to examine dynamic changes of affective
forecasts and/or experiences over time. Within-
subjects designs in which participants forecast their
affective reaction once and rate their affective experi-
ence several times (e.g., Wilson et al., 2000) allow us
to gain insights into the time course of affective expe-
riences but remain silent on the influence of temporal
distance on affective forecasting accuracy. Within-
subjects designs in which participants forecast their
affective reaction several times but do not report their
affective experience (e.g., Shepperd, Ouellette, &
Fernandez, 1996) allow us to investigate the influence
of temporal distance on affective forecasts but remain
silent on affective experiences. Finally, within-subject
designs in which participants forecast their affective
reactions twice and rate their affective experiences
twice (Sanna & Schwarz, 2004) allow for the exami-
nation of linear temporal changes but do not allow us
to examine quadratic changes in affective experiences.
Therefore, our study is the first to explicitly consider
the effect of time course and temporal distance on
forecasting accuracy. Moreover, it is one of the first
studies to recognize dynamic temporal changes in
affective experiences and affective forecasting, and, we
argue, will help to illuminate when and why forecast-
ing accuracy will vary over time.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 37 participants participated in a study on
“Subjective Reactions Surrounding Driving Exams.”
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Participants were recruited in classes and with adver-
tisements. Their mean age was 19.65 years (SD = 2.35).
A total of 8 men (21.6%) and 29 women participated
and all participants, except 1, had the Dutch nationality
(97.1%). Participants who completed the study received
€20 for their participation (about 23 U.S. dollars). The
group was further divided on the basis of actual exam
performance, resulting in success (n = 20) and failure
conditions (n = 17).
Procedure
In recruiting our sample, we placed advertisements in
the classified section of the university newspaper and on
university bulletin boards. We further announced the
study in first-year student courses of different faculties
of the university. Interested people contacted the
research assistant and were scheduled for an introduc-
tory session at our laboratory. Participants completed
large batteries of questionnaires. At the introductory
session, questionnaires contained measures of disposi-
tional traits (e.g., state-action orientation, achievement
motivation). During the diary periods before and after
the exam, questionnaires included measures of affective
forecasts and experiences, psychosocial well-being,
attributional tendencies, and appraisals of the exam and
the examiner. We describe only those measures relevant
to the aims of the current hypotheses below.
At the introductory session, about 6 days before their
exam, participants completed a background question-
naire, tapping demographics and information surround-
ing the driving exam (i.e., number of lessons, earlier
exams). The assistant then introduced the experience
sampling device, the so-called beeper (Palm Pilot CE
M105), which we programmed with the Experience
Sampling Program (ESP version 4.0) by Feldman-
Barrett and Barrett (2001). She familiarized participants
with its use and instructed participants to start com-
pleting the daily questionnaires the following day (or
provided participants with a date when the interval was
greater than one day), complete the daily measures in
the evening, preferably at the same time each day, and
return their beepers the day after their exam. Participants
also received a questionnaire for the day their exam
took place and a printed version of all daily question-
naires (as a fallback in case the beeper failed). The
research assistant then answered all questions that par-
ticipants had and set up the following appointment.
One day after their exam, participants returned to
the laboratory. They returned the beeper and the com-
pleted printed questionnaires of the day of their exam.
They received a follow-up beeper that assessed their
affective experiences following the exam and scheduled
the final session.
At the final session, participants returned the follow-
up beeper. The research assistant described the purpose
of the study to participants, paid them, and thanked
them for their participation.
Questionnaires
Background information. The initial questionnaire
asked participants for basic demographic information
(i.e., age, gender, ethnicity) and information relevant to
the driving exam. Specifically, participants reported
how many driving lessons they had had (1 = 5 lessons,
2 = 10 lessons, 3 = 15 lessons, 4 = 20 lessons, 5 = 25
lessons, 6 = 30 lessons, 7 = more than 30). In addition,
participants reported how often they had tried to pass
the driving exam previously (0 to more than 4 times)
and had taken practice exams (0 to more than 4 times).
Affective forecasts and experiences for success and fail-
ure. To assess affective forecasts, all participants estimated
on 7-point scales each day for 5 consecutive days before
their exam1 (–D5, –D4, –D3, –D2, –D1) how happy and
how disappointed they would feel immediately after their
exam (T0) and the 5 subsequent days (T1 = 1 day after,
T2 = 2 days after, T3 = 3 days after, T4 = 4 days after, and
T5 = 5 days after) if they were to pass or fail the exam
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much). To assess affective experi-
ences, participants in the success condition estimated on
7-point scales each day, including the day of the exam (D-
Day) and 5 subsequent days (+D1, +D2, +D3, +D4, +D5),
how happy they felt (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).
Participants in the failure condition estimated on 7-point
scales each day, including the day of the exam (D-Day)
and 5 subsequent days (+D1, +D2, +D3, +D4, +D5), how
disappointed they felt (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).2
RESULTS
Descriptive Analyses
On average participants took more than 30 driving
lessons (M = 6.67, SD = 0.67), which corresponds to the
national average (Consumentenbond, 2005). They had
once previously tried passing the exam (M = 1.18, SD =
1.01) and had one practice exam (M = 1.30, SD = 0.46).
Participants who succeeded and those who failed did
not differ on these variables (all Fs < 1). No gender dif-
ferences were observed for these variables (all Fs < 1).
Overall Models
The wealth of information in the 72 measures
involved in the study allows us to test the hypotheses
1156 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
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advanced in the theoretical section. We tested these
hypotheses by means of specific contrasts designed to
reflect the expected pattern of means. Nonetheless, to
“protect” the subsequent specific tests, we first describe
the overall sources of variation in our data by means of
two overall models. The overall pattern of means is pic-
tured in Figures 1 and 2.
Modeling forecasts. The first model involves the
entire set of 60 forecast measures in a 5 (day of forecast:
–D5, –D4, –D3, –D2, –D1) × 6 (target day: T0, +T1,
+T2, +T3, +T4, and +T5) × 2 (affect: Happiness,
Disappointment) repeated measures ANOVA. This
analysis showed the following effects: A significant
main effect of day of forecast,3 F(4, 144) = 2.48, p =
.046, pη2 = .06, indicating that participants’ forecasts
changed as the day of exam approached, averaging
across affect and target day. A strong, significant main
effect of target day, F(5, 180) = 110.14, p < .001, pη2 =
.75, indicated that across affect and day of forecast,
participants forecasted a marked change in their affec-
tive reaction as days after the exam pass by. A strong,
significant effect of affect, F(1, 36) = 30.11, p <.001,
pη2 = .45, indicated that on average, forecasts for hap-
piness were more intense than forecasts for disappoint-
ment. Note that this overall effect of affect is not
indicative of the hypothesized asymmetric impact bias,
because the tested overall model does not consider expe-
rienced affect.
A significant interaction between day of forecast and
target day, F(20, 720) = 2.87, p < .001, pη2 = .07, indi-
cated that participants’ expectations of change in affect
due to time differ as the exam approaches. A marginally
significant interaction between affect and target day,
F(5, 180) = 6.41, p = .058, pη2 = .15, suggests that the
forecasted change in affect after the exam differs for
happiness and disappointment. Finally, a significant
three-way interaction, F(20, 720) = 2.57, p < .001, pη2 =
.06, showed that the mentioned interaction between day
of forecast and target day is moderated by affect. That
is, participants’ forecasts of change in affect are shaped
differently for happiness and disappointment. The inter-
action between target day and affect was nonsignificant,
F(4, 144) = 1.96, p = .104, pη2 = .05.
Modeling forecasts and experiences for success and
failure. The second model expands the first one by
including the experienced affect reported after the
exam. This model examines and compares participants’
response trends over time and encompasses all contrasts
concerning accuracy of participants’ forecasts. As com-
pared to the first model, then, in the second model the
within-subject factor day of forecast not only includes
participants’ affective forecasts before the exam but also
their affective experiences after the exam. Accordingly,
we refer to this factor as day of measurement. In addi-
tion, affect in the second model represents a between-
subjects factor because participants reported only the
experienced affect that was congruent with their exam
outcome (happiness for success and disappointment for
failure).4 The model features a 6 (day of measurement:
–D5, –D4, –D3, –D2, –D1, Experienced) × 6 (target
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Figure 1 Overall pattern of means for forecasts and experiences of
happiness.
NOTE: –D5 = forecast 5 days before the exam, –D4 = forecast 4 days
before the exam, –D3 = forecast 3 days before the exam, –D2 = fore-
cast 2 days before the exam, –D1 = forecast 1 day before the exam;
Experienced = experienced affective reaction; T0 = immediately after
the exam, T1 = 1 day after, T2 = 2 days after, T3 = 3 days after, T4 =
4 days after, and T5 = 5 days after the exam.
Figure 2 Overall pattern of means for forecasts and experiences of
disappointment.
NOTE: –D5 = forecast 5 days before the exam, –D4 = forecast 4 days
before the exam, –D3 = forecast 3 days before the exam, –D2 = fore-
cast 2 days before the exam, –D1 = forecast 1 day before the exam;
Experienced = experienced affective reaction; T0 = immediately after
the exam, T1 = 1 day after, T2 = 2 days after, T3 = 3 days after, T4 =
4 days after, and T5 = 5 days after the exam.
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day: +T0, +T1, +T2, +T3, +T4, T5) × 2 (Affect:
Happiness, Disappointment) mixed model ANOVA.
Replicating the first model results with the inclusion
of the reports on experienced affect, we found a signifi-
cant main effect of day of measurement, F(5, 165) =
10.77, p < .001, pη2 = .24, a significant main effect of
target day, F(5, 165) = 104.26, p < .001, pη2 = .75, and
a significant effect of affect, F(1, 33) = 11.27, p = .002,
pη2 = .25. Furthermore, the second model replicates all
high-order effects found in the first model. Specifically,
we found an interaction between day of measurement
and target day, F(25, 825) = 1.80, p = .009, pη2 = .05, a
significant interaction between day of measurement and
affect, F(5, 165) = 10.77, p < .001, pη2 = .24, and a sig-
nificant three-way interaction, F(25, 825) = 1.50, p =
.054, pη2 = .04. Extending the first model, we found a
significant interaction between affect and target day,
F(5, 165) = 3.60, p = .004, pη2 =.10, indicating that by
including the experienced affect, the differences
between forecasted and experienced affect differ for
happiness and disappointment.
To recap, the first model shows that affective fore-
casts vary as a function of the day on which they are
made (i.e., day of forecast). Also, they depend on
whether they concern affective experiences in the imme-
diate aftermath of the focal event or experiences further
in the future (i.e., day of measurement). Finally, affec-
tive forecasts vary across the type of affect involved in
the affective experience (i.e., affect). The second model
additionally shows that this dependency of the forecasts
is maintained when we only consider forecasts congru-
ent with the actual outcome of the event. That is, also
when considering forecasts and experiences for success
and failure separately, affective forecasts vary as a func-
tion of the day on which they are made, suggesting that
they vary as a function of the temporal distance to the
exam. Taken together, the results of these two overall
models justify subsequent tests of the specific hypothe-
ses advanced in the theoretical section.
The Positive-Negative Asymmetry of the Impact Bias
The impact bias implies that participants overesti-
mate the intensity and duration of their affective reac-
tions to the focal event. We should hence observe that
the overall forecasted affect on each day before the focal
event is more intense than the average experienced
affect across the entire postexam period. This hypothe-
sis corresponds to a contrast that aggregates all fore-
casts (i.e., mean of all forecasts) and compares them
with the experienced affect after the focal event (i.e.,
mean of experienced affect on D-day, +D1, +D2, +D3,
+D4, and +D5). If there is a negative-positive asymme-
try, the contrast should be moderated by affect, imply-
ing an interaction between affect and the contrast
because the contrast should be stronger for negative
than for positive affect.
In line with our prediction, the results yielded a sig-
nificant contrast, F(1, 33) = 28.95, p < .001, pη2 = .46,
and the expected significant interaction with affect,
F(1,33) = 14.72, p < .001, pη2 = .30. As can be seen in
Table 1 (bottom), participants commit the impact bias,
that is, their affective forecasts overestimate the inten-
sity of their experienced affect. Moreover, replicating
previous research, the impact bias is more pronounced
for negative than for positive affect. For negative affect,
simple effect analyses show that people grossly overesti-
mated the intensity of their disappointment after having
failed the exam, F(1, 33) = 26.28, p < .001, pη2 = .46.
For positive affect, on the contrary, although there are
slight differences between forecasts of happiness after
passing the exam, the difference does not reach signifi-
cance, F(1, 33) = 1.39, p = .24, pη2 = .06.
To unfold the observed impact bias as it develops
across forecasting days before the exam, we estimated,
with appropriate contrasts, the differences between the
average experienced affect after the exam and the aver-
age forecasted affect for each day before the exam (i.e.,
we compare the overall mean of experienced affect on
TABLE 1: Comparison of Overall Forecasts on One Day With Overall Experienced Affect
Positive Affect Negative Affect
Day of Prediction Mean Difference SD Effect Size (r) F Mean Difference SD Effect Size (r) F
–D5 0.16 1.12 .143 0.40 1.40 1.12 .789 23.21†
–D4 0.33 1.15 .284 1.67 1.33 1.26 .739 16.87†
–D3 0.16 0.93 .173 0.59 1.72 1.27 .814 27.61†
–D2 0.25 0.85 .292 1.79 1.53 1.12 .817 28.21†
–D1 0.34 0.78 .406 3.77* 1.42 1.19 .777 21.41†
Average 0.24 0.87 1.62 1.48 1.03 26.28†
* p < .10. † p < .001.
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D-day, +D1, +D2, +D3, +D4, and +D5, with means
computed for each forecast day –D5, –D4, –D3, –D2,
and –D1). Given the moderating effect of affect (see
above), we conducted the analyses for happiness and
disappointment separately.
For happiness, a marginally significant bias emerged
only for the day before the exam (i.e., –D1) when par-
ticipants forecasted that they would be happier (M =
6.04) after passing the exam than they actually were
(M = 5.70), F(1, 19) = 3.77, p = .067, r = .46. It should
be noted, however, that all mean differences are in the
positive direction (forecasts of happiness are more
intense than experienced happiness) and they are
accompanied by not trivial effect size indexes (r’s from
.14 to .46). Given our small sample, a small but coher-
ent impact bias may be present in the positive affect
forecasting, although the evidence is not strong enough
to reject the statistical null hypothesis.
For disappointment, a significant and strong differ-
ence emerged between the average forecast and the expe-
rienced affect for each day before the exam (see Table 1).
For each day, participants consistently expected a more
intense disappointment after failing the exam than what
they actually experienced in the days after they failed the
exam. For each day, the size of the impact bias is slightly
bigger than one standard deviation, corresponding to
Cohen’s d of around 1.30 and a correlation of .70. By
inspecting the effect size indexes, furthermore, one can
appreciate that the impact bias remains stable across all 5
days of forecast before the exam took place. This stabil-
ity in the impact bias for disappointment (i.e., the lack of
differences in the bias effects across days before the
exam) is supported by an appropriate inferential test,5
F(4, 56) = 0.75, p = .561, pη2 = .05.
Thus, on each day of the forecasting period, partici-
pants overestimated the intensity of their experienced
affect over the course of the 5 days following the exam.
However, they were more accurate in predicting the
overall intensity of their positive affect over the course
of the five days following their exam than in predicting
the intensity of negative affect, for which a strong
impact bias was evident.
As mentioned in the introduction, the time slice
approach evaluates forecasting accuracy by comparing
forecasts at one particular point in time before the event
takes place with the experiences at one point in time
after the event has taken place (e.g., Gilbert et al.,
1998). Our design allows us to evaluate forecasting
accuracy for the affect experienced on the day of the
exam and five consecutive days after the exam. For this
comparison, we compared the average forecasted affect
intensity for each day after the event across all forecast-
ing days (i.e., average forecasted affect intensity on –D5,
–D4, –D3, –D2, and –D1 for D-Day, for +D1, for +D2,
for +D3, for +D4, and for +D5, respectively). This
allowed us to compare the average forecasted affect
intensity with the experienced affect intensity for each
post-exam day, for happiness and disappointment sepa-
rately (see Table 2). This set of analyses may therefore
be considered a closer replication of existing studies on
affective forecasting accuracy.
Consistent with these studies, the results of our sec-
ond analysis show that people commit the impact bias
and, again, confirm the positive-negative asymmetry
(see Table 2). After having passed the exam, people tend
to overestimate their happiness in the future, especially
1 and 2 days after the exam (i.e., +D1 and +D2).
Overall, participants predict that their happiness will be
more intense than it actually is. After having failed the
exam, people show a consistent and stable impact bias,
with the forecasted disappointment being more intense
than the experienced one. People grossly (effect sizes r’s
from .65 to .75) overestimate the intensity of their disap-
pointment after the exam, and they do so to a greater extent
as more time after the exam has elapsed (see Table 2).
In sum, these findings closely replicate previous findings
on the positive-negative asymmetry for the impact bias. In
their forecasts, participants overestimate the intensity of
their negative affect following the failure of an important
exam much more than they overestimate their positive
affect following the success of an important exam.
Next, we examined people’s forecasting accuracy for
the time course of their affective experience. That is, we
examined the extent to which participants were able to
TABLE 2: Comparison of Average Forecasts for One Day With Experienced Affect on That Day
Positive Affect Negative Affect
Day of Prediction Mean Difference SD Effect Size (r) F Mean Difference SD Effect Size (r) F
D-Day 0.13 0.54 .234 1.11 1.42 1.00 .656 3.72*
+D1 0.52 1.01 .470 5.39** 1.69 2.01 .750 10.63†
+D2 0.69 1.60 .404 3.72* 1.72 1.56 .727 18.09†
+D3 0.28 1.06 .257 1.35 1.73 1.69 .661 15.70†
+D4 0.01 1.51 .007 <.01 1.60 1.88 .682 10.88†
+D5 0.13 1.43 .234 .17 1.74 1.93 .656 12.24†
*p < .10. ** p < .05. † p < .001.
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forecast the change and the speed of change of their
affective experience after the exam. Also, we examined
whether their forecasting accuracy would be moderated
by the temporal distance to the focal event. Specifically,
we expected that when the exam is distant, people accu-
rately forecast their positive affect and they inaccurately
predict (i.e., overestimate) their positive affect when the
event is close. Conversely, we expected that people inac-
curately forecast (i.e., overestimate) their negative affect
when the event is distant and accurately predict their
negative affect when the event is close.
Time Course Accuracy as a Function
of Temporal Distance
In discussing the first of our overall models, we
noticed that forecasted intensity of affect changed
across days after the exam took place, and that this
change depended on the day on which the forecast was
made. Furthermore, we found that the interaction
between day of forecast and target day was different for
positive and negative affect. In the following analyses,
we examine how these changes in forecasted intensity
correspond to the actual change of experienced affect
after the exam took place. In light of the three-way
interaction found for day of forecast, target day, and
affect, we conducted the analyses for happiness and dis-
appointment separately.
Happiness
Time course of the experience. We first describe how
the experienced happiness changed over the 5 days after
the exam took place. After the exam, we observe a dif-
ference in average experienced affect happiness as days
go by, F(5, 95) = 8.09, p < .001, pη2 = .30, indicating
that people’s experienced happiness decreases over time
(cf. Figure 1, far right). This decrease can be partitioned
into a linear trend, F(1, 19) = 22.27, p < .001, r = .73,
and a quadratic trend, F(1, 19) =11.07, p = .004, r =
.60. No other polynomial trend was significant. The
observed linear trend indicates that people experienced
changes in happiness that start at a high level of inten-
sity and then decrease at a constant rate over the time
period after the exam. The observed quadratic trend
indicates that the intensity of happiness decreases
rapidly over the first days following the exam before
tapering off later on. These effects are captured in
Figure 1: Happiness clearly decreases over time (linear
trend). In addition, the speed of change is maximal from
D-day to +D1, it slows down between +D2 and +D3,
and finally stabilizes up to +D5 (quadratic trend).
To test whether participants are more accurate in
forecasting the linear trend of their affective experience
than the quadratic trend, we first conducted trend
analyses for each day of the prediction. Except for –D5,
where participants forecasted a quadratic trend for the
time course of their happiness, F(1, 19) = 7.92, p < .01,
r = .53, no significant quadratic trends emerged for the
forecasted happiness after the exam on any other day.
For each day of the forecasting, however, clear linear
trends emerged (all Fs > 29 and all r’s > .80, cf. Table
3). Thus, people in the success condition clearly seem to
know that “time heals all wounds” (even the good
ones). They forecast that their happiness will fade over
time, and that it will do so at a constant, linear rate.
Time course of forecasting accuracy as a function of
temporal distance. We then tested whether the linear
trends and the quadratic trends predicted by partici-
pants on the 5 different days before the exam were dif-
ferent from each other (i.e., whether participants’
representations of the change of their happiness
changed over the days of forecast), and whether they
differed from the trend observed for their experienced
happiness. Thus, we estimated the interaction between the
trends in forecasts by day of forecast, namely a Day ×
Linear-Trend and Day × Quadratic-Trend, and then
TABLE 3: Happiness: Comparison Between Linear and Quadratic Terms for Forecasts and Experienced Affects on Each Day of Forecast
Day of Measurement Linear Trend Effect Size Difference With Experienced Quadratic Trend Effect Size Difference With Experienced
–D5 .857† .206 .533** .226
–D4 .832† .180 .237 .439**
–D3 .869† .359 .302 .478**
–D2 .860† .432* .128 .581***
–D1 .821† .277 .094 .456**
Experienced .734† — .606*** —
NOTE: Effect sizes are expressed in terms of correlations. For linear and quadratic trends, a larger correlation indicates a stronger trend. For dif-
ference with experienced, a larger correlation indicates a larger difference between predicted and experienced trend, thus greater inaccuracy.
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. † p < .001.
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estimated the differences between forecasted trends
(linear and quadratic) for each day of forecasts and the
experienced affects trends.
The 6 linear trends (one experienced and five fore-
casted) did not yield significant differences, F(5, 95) =
1.33, p = .256, pη2 = .06, nor did any linear trend fore-
casted on any day before the exam differ from the experi-
enced one (cf. Table 3). Thus, confirming that people’s
affective forecasts are accurate when one considers the lin-
ear part of change in affective experiences, participants’
forecasts do not change as a function of temporal distance
to the focal event, and they do not differ from the linear
course of their experienced affect. Intensity of happiness
decreases as time goes by, and people know that very well.
In contrast, the six quadratic terms (one experienced
and five forecasted) showed a significant difference, F(5,
95) = 3.74, p = .004, pη2 = .16, indicating that some
quadratic trend in affective forecasts for happiness on a
specific day of forecasts differs from the experienced
one. We then tested these comparisons. Recall that the
experienced happiness decreased quadratically, F(1, 19)
= 11.07, p = .004, r = .60. At –D5, participants fore-
casted a quadratic trend (cf. Table 3), rendering the
comparison between the experienced and the predicted
quadratic trend nonsignificant, F(1, 19) = 1.03, p =
.323, r = .22. On –D4, participants forecasted a small
quadratic trend, revealing a significant comparison, F(1,
19) = 4.54, p = .04. r = .43. On days –D3, –D2, and
–D1, participants did not forecast a quadratic trend,
making the comparisons between forecasted and expe-
rienced trend significant, F(1, 19) = 5.63, p = .032, r =
.47 , F(1, 19) = 9.70, p = .005, r = .58, and F(1, 19) =
5.00, p = .037, r = .45, respectively. Thus, consistent
with our hypothesis, as regards the quadratic part of the
change in happiness, participants’ forecasts do change
over time and differ from the quadratic trend of their
experienced happiness. In addition, these findings are
moderated by temporal distance, because quadratic
trends for happiness are accurately forecasted when the
event is distant and become more inaccurate as the
event draws closer. This change of quadratic accuracy
across temporal distance was statistically supported,
F(4, 76) = 2.32, p = .064, pη2 = .10.
These results suggest that people forecast a linear
decrease of the intensity of their happiness over time.
Because happiness does decrease over time, participants’
forecasts appear accurate. In addition, they are able to
forecast the quadratic trend of their positive affect expe-
rience when the event was distant. This result supports our
prediction that people are more accurate in predicting their
positive affect following a focal event when the event is
distant (i.e., on –D5 and –D4) than when it is closer (i.e.,
on –D3, –D2, and –D1). Forecasting accuracy for posi-
tive affect seems to decrease as the focal event draws
nearer in time and people fail to consider the quadratic
nature of the decrease of happiness, making their predic-
tions more inaccurate when the event is close.
Disappointment
Time course of the experience. Paralleling the results
found for happiness, we observe a difference in average
experienced disappointment as days go by, F(7, 70) =
17.36, p < .001, pη2 = .55, indicating that disappoint-
ment decreases over time. Again, the decrease can be
partitioned into a linear trend, F(1, 14) = 57.30, p <
.001, r = .89, and a quadratic trend, F(1, 14) = 13.61,
p < .001, r = .64. The linear trend indicates that, paral-
leling the findings for happiness, experienced disap-
pointment decreases at a constant rate over the time
period after the exam. The quadratic trend indicates
that the speed with which the intensity decreases is very
rapid right after the exam before tapering off later on.
To investigate whether participants are more accu-
rate in forecasting the linear trend of their affective
experience than the quadratic trend, we first conducted
trend analyses for each day of the prediction. Except for
days –D1 and –D2, where participants forecasted qua-
dratic trends for the time course of their disappointment,
F(1, 14) = 4.55, p = .05, r = .49, and F(1, 14) = 3.53,
p = .08, r = .44, no quadratic trends emerged for the
forecasted disappointment on any other day. For each
day of the forecasting, however, clear linear trends
emerged (all Fs > 12, cf. Table 4).
Time course accuracy as a function of temporal dis-
tance. As for happiness, we then tested whether the lin-
ear and quadratic trends forecasted by participants
differed across days of predictions before the exam and
whether they differed from the trend of the experienced
disappointment.
The six linear trends (one experienced and five fore-
casted) did not reveal a significant difference, F(5, 70) =
1.69, p = .14, pη2 = .10, nor did any forecasted linear
trend on any day before the exam differ from the experi-
enced one (cf. Table 4). As for happiness, these findings
support the hypothesis that regarding the linear part of the
change in affective experiences, participants’ forecasts do
not change as a function of temporal distance and do not
differ from the linear course of their experienced affect.
In contrast, the six quadratic terms (one experienced
and five forecasted) showed a significant difference,
F(5, 70) = 2.39, p = .046. Some quadratic trends fore-
casted on a particular day were different from the expe-
rienced one. Recall that the actual disappointment
decreases quadratically, F(1, 14) = 13.61, p < .001, r =
.64. On –D5 and –D4, participants did not predict a
quadratic trend (cf. Table 4), rendering the comparison
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between the experienced and the forecasted quadratic
trend marginally significant, F(1, 14) = 3.80, p =.07,
r = .46 and F(1, 14) = 3.66, p = .07, r = .43, respectively.
On –D3, participants did not predict a quadratic trend,
making the comparison significant, F(1, 14) = 4.61, p =
.04, r = .49. On –D2 and –D1, participants predicted a
quadratic trend (cf. Table 4), making the comparison
with the experienced trend nonsignificant, F(1, 14) =
1.81, p = .19, r = .33 and F(1, 14) = 1.26, p =.28, r =
.28. Consistent with our predictions, regarding the
quadratic part of the change in disappointment, partic-
ipants’ forecasts do change as a function of temporal
distance to the exam and differ from the quadratic
course of their experienced disappointment, especially
when the exam is distant. Inspection of the effect size
indexes (cf. Table 4) shows how accuracy regarding the
speed of change of the negative affect increases as the
focal event approaches. This change of quadratic accu-
racy across temporal distance was statistically sup-
ported, F(4, 64) = 2.63, p = .042, pη2 = .14.
These results closely mirror the ones found for happi-
ness. People seem to be able to accurately forecast a lin-
ear decrease of the intensity of their disappointment over
time. In addition, they were able to forecast the quadratic
trend of their experience when the event was close. This
result supports our prediction that people are more accu-
rate in predicting their negative affect following a focal
event when the event is close (i.e., on –D2 and –D1) than
when it is distant (i.e., on –D5, –D4, and –D3).
Forecasting accuracy for negative affect seems to increase
as the event draws nearer in time and people consider the
quadratic nature of the decline of happiness, making their
predictions more accurate when the event is close.
DISCUSSION
The present study is the first to investigate the role of
time in affective forecasting. Using a longitudinal diary
paradigm among people taking their driving exam,
we replicate existing findings on the positive-negative
asymmetry of the impact bias. Moreover, we extend
previous findings by showing how both the time course
of an affective experience and the temporal distance to
the focal event influence forecasting accuracy.
Participants grossly overestimated both the intensity
and the duration of their disappointment toward failing
their driver’s license exam, whereas they only slightly
overestimated their happiness following success at the
exam. Consistent with existing findings on affective fore-
casting (e.g., Dunn et al., 2003; see Wilson & Gilbert,
2003), they show an impact bias and this bias is more
pronounced for negative affect than for positive affect.
Our study is the first to show how time affects fore-
casting accuracy, thereby extending previous research in
important ways. First, the present results show that
regarding the time course of an affective experience
people’s affective forecasts accurately reflect linear
changes in their affective experiences. Their affective
forecasts, however, do not accurately reflect quadratic
changes in affective experiences. Our results therefore
confirm the suggestion that people have naïve theories
about how time influences their affective experiences (cf.
Ross, 1989). They know that the intensity of their affec-
tive reactions to future events will diminish over time (cf.
Igou, 2004). What they do not know is how fast both
their positive and negative affective reactions diminish.
Their theories about the progression of their affect are
inaccurate, not because they are generally inaccurate, but
because people fail to consider quadratic changes in
affective experiences when making affective forecasts.
Thus, our study is the first to show that people realize
that time will tamper their affective reactions but that
they underestimate the speed with which this process will
take place. Second, our results show that the temporal
distance to an event moderates people’s accuracy about
the time course of their affective experiences. Their fore-
casting accuracy for positive affect is greater the more
distant an event is and decreases as an event approaches.
Conversely, their forecasting accuracy for negative affect
TABLE 4: Disappointment: Comparison Between Linear and Quadratic Terms for Forecasts and Experienced Affects on Each Day of
Forecast
Day of Measurement Linear Trend Effect Size Difference With Experienced Quadratic Trend Effect Size Difference With Experienced
–D5 .675*** .426* .053 .462*
–D4 .817† .299 .293 .439*
–D3 .889† .303 .306 .497**
–D2 .861† .279 .495* .338
–D1 .872† .329 .448* .287
Experienced .896† — .702*** —
NOTE: Effect sizes are expressed in terms of correlations. For linear and quadratic trends, a larger correlation indicates a stronger trend. For dif-
ference with experienced, a larger correlation indicates a larger difference between predicted and experienced trend, thus greater inaccuracy.
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. † p < .001.
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is smaller the more distant an event is and increases as an
event draws closer. Thus, the present study adds to the
extant literature by showing that people’s forecasting
accuracy varies as a function of the temporal distance to
the focal event.
One explanation for the finding that people forecast
linear changes in affect progression may be that before an
event takes place, multiple outcomes are possible. For
example, before an exam has taken place, both success
and failure are still possible outcomes. Hsee and Zangh
(2004) argue that before making choices, people compare
multiple scenarios with each other, a comparative frame
of mind that they termed a joint evaluation mode. People
who are in such a comparative frame compare and weigh
success and failure scenarios against each other.
According to Hsee and Zangh such a comparison
between scenarios is relatively easy, because it is easy to
discern the differences between them and should lead to
linear predictions. Confirming their suggestion, Hsee and
Zangh found that the function that best described
people’s predictions and evaluations in the joint evalua-
tion mode was relatively steep and smooth, that is, linear.
Participants in our study may have been in such a com-
parative frame of mind when making their affective fore-
casts. They may have based their forecasts on the
comparison of success versus failure scenarios. If partici-
pants were in such a joint evaluation mode before the
exam, they should be able to predict relatively easily that
they will be happier when succeeding the exam than
when failing it (cf. Wilson et al., 2000) and these predic-
tions tend to be linear (cf. Hsee & Zangh, 2004). It
would be interesting to examine what people’s affective
forecasting functions were to look like in a single evalua-
tion mode, in which they face only one scenario. In our
study, participants were in such a single evaluation mode
after the exam took place and they knew that they had
either succeeded or failed the exam. If asked to forecast
their affective reactions to their success or failure after the
exam has taken place, according to Hsee and Zangh
(2004), the forecasting function should be more qua-
dratic than the forecasting function before the exam.
Another explanation for people’s negligence in con-
sidering quadratic changes in affective forecasts is
offered by the literature on biases in affective forecast-
ing (e.g., Gilbert, Driver-Lynn, & Wilson, 2002;
Gilbert, Gill, et al., 2002; Wilson & Gilbert 2003).
People tend to misimagine the focal event and its conse-
quences when making predictions about how it will
make them feel. This misconstrual of the event may
cause them to underestimate the speed with which their
affective reactions will decrease (i.e., the quadratic trend
of their predictions). Any intervention that enables
people to realistically imagine how an event will unfold
should increase people’s forecasting accuracy for the
speed with which the intensity of their affective reaction
will return to baseline (Buehler & MacFarland, 2001;
Wilson et al., 2000).
As predicted, people’s forecasting accuracy varied as a
function of the temporal distance to the focal event. The
pattern of results found is consistent with our predictions
derived from the literature on motivational principles
(e.g., Erber et al., 2004; Gohm, 2003; Shepperd et al.,
2000). When an important event is distant, people are
motivated to pursue a positive outcome. Their intuitive
theories on how affect influences performance may lead
them to down-regulate positive affect and up-regulate
negative affect to maintain their motivation and work
hard to achieve their goal. For forecasting accuracy, the
pattern we found is compatible with this reasoning.
Specifically, when the event was distant, people accu-
rately predicted the linear and quadratic trends for their
positive affect, indicating that they expect that their pos-
itive affect after success will decrease (i.e., linear trend)
and that it will decrease fast (i.e., quadratic trend). They
inaccurately predicted their negative affect after failure,
indicating that they overestimated the time with which
negative affect would linger (i.e., failed to predict the qua-
dratic trend). This combination of forecasts may lead
people to overestimate the aversive impact of the event
and may motivate them to work hard to prevent the aver-
sive outcome from occurring.
When the important event is close, however, people are
motivated by softening the aversive impact of the event
should it turn out to be negative. Their intuitive reaction
when the event is so close that they cannot actively do any-
thing to control the outcome anymore is to mobilize strate-
gies that down-regulate negative affect and up-regulate
positive affect. Again the pattern we found for forecasting
accuracy when the event is close is compatible with this
suggestion. Specifically, when the event was close, people
accurately predicted the linear and quadratic trends for
their negative affect, indicating that they expect that their
negative affect following failure will decrease (i.e., linear
trend) and that it will decrease fast (i.e., quadratic trend).
They inaccurately predicted their positive affect, indicat-
ing that they overestimated the time with which positive
affect after success would linger (i.e., failed to predict the
quadratic trend). This combination of forecasts may lead
people to realistically perceive the aversive impact of the
event as temporary and may motivate them to minimize
its eventual impact.
This pattern of results may give an indication of the
mechanism underlying the influence time has on affec-
tive processing. People may be motivated to advance
and achieve their goals when the event is distant,
whereas they may be motivated to avoid risk and seek
security when the event is close (e.g., Förster & Higgins,
2005; Pennington & Roese, 2003). When an event is
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distant, the overestimation of negative affect and the
accurate forecast of positive affect may provide people
with an extra drive to achieve their goal and invest all
necessary resources (e.g., Gohm, 2003; Västfjäll &
Gärling, 2006). When an event is close, on the contrary,
the overestimation of positive affect and the accurate
forecast of negative affect may provide people with
information necessary to successfully cope with a poten-
tially aversive outcome. In addition, it may help them to
regulate and reduce arousal, stress, and anxiety that are
often linked to the approach of important, relevant
events (e.g., Derryberry & Reed, 2002). Reflecting such
a motivational pattern, our results suggest that people
are more attuned to achieving positive outcomes when
the temporal distance is large, whereas they are more
attuned to bracing for loss when the temporal distance
to the event is small.
Future research should investigate the role of affect
in the observed motivational pattern. People have diffi-
culties predicting how they will feel and react in affec-
tive states that are different from their current states
(e.g., Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). In this per-
spective, people may have felt more positive when the
event was distant. This positive affect may have served
as a cue for the predictions of happiness, rendering
these forecasts more accurate. Conversely, people may
have felt more negative when the event drew closer.
This negative affect may have served as a cue for the
predictions of disappointment, rendering these forecasts
more accurate.
Forecasting accuracy may be influenced by lay theo-
ries that individuals hold about the progression of dif-
ferent emotions. In the present research, we focused on
two specific emotions, that is, disappointment and hap-
piness. These emotions represent in our research setting
the most relevant negative and positive emotion that
participants experience after failure and success, respec-
tively. Future research could investigate whether our
obtained results for disappointment and happiness gen-
eralize to other negative emotions like regret, anger,
guilt, or shame and to other positive emotions like
pride, relief, or hope.
The time course of affective forecasts and experiences
represents a challenge for researchers. Previous research
on affective forecasting has examined accuracy using
almost exclusively one form of the time slice paradigm. In
this research, accuracy was operationalized as the differ-
ence between a forecast at one point in time and an expe-
rience at one of several points in time. We are among the
first who have looked at multiple assessments of affect
before and after a focal event. Various challenges—
statistical, experiential, or measurement among others
(e.g., Hsee & Abelson, 1991; Larsen & Frederickson,
1999)—surround the repeated measure of affective
forecasts and experiences. For example, one could argue
that the repeated measurement of affective forecasts may
distort people’s actual experiences (cf., Wilson & Gilbert,
2003). Future studies should investigate the implications
of repeated measurements on affective experiences more
systematically. Until more empirical data is available, it
remains impossible to exclude such influences in repeated
measurements, and therefore they remain a reason for
cautiousness. Despite this cautiousness, the consistency
with which our findings replicate previous findings on the
impact bias and its positive-negative asymmetry provide
us with confidence in the validity of our findings and sug-
gest that our findings are among the first to allow us
exciting insights into the time course of affective forecasts
and experiences.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our study investigated the role of time in affective
forecasting. We began with the general observation that
people make biased predictions about their affective reac-
tions to future events and argued that the accuracy of
these affective forecasts will be influenced by time—
specifically the time course of the affective reactions and
the temporal distance to the focal event. Our findings
corroborate our hypotheses by indicating that people are
more accurate in predicting their positive affect when an
event is distant, whereas they are more accurate in pre-
dicting their negative affect when an event is close.
Moreover, our findings indicate that although people are
accurate in predicting the decrease of the intensity of their
affective reactions, they are inaccurate in predicting the
speed with which this decrease takes place. The present
study is the first to shed new light on the influence of tem-
poral factors on forecasting accuracy and may provide a
more optimistic view on people’s capacity to make pre-
dictions about factors that will guide their decisions and
behavior regarding important future events.
NOTES
1. The capital letter “D” refers to the day on which the measure-
ment took place, with a minus (e.g.,–D1,–D2, etc.) to indicate days
before the exam, D-day is used for the day of the exam, and a plus
(e.g., +D1, +D2, etc) to indicate days after the exam. In addition, the
capital letter “T” indicates the target day; that is, the day the partici-
pant was forecasting about. Thus, participants’ forecasts for their
experiences 2 days after the exam made 3 days before the exam is
referred to as –D3T2. Because measures of affect made after the
exams are measures about the same day, we simply refer to them as
+D1, +D2, and so on, instead of +D1T1, +D2T2, and so on.
2. One question that may arise is whether the types of scale used to
assess affective forecasts may have favored linear over quadratic trends.
Possibly, quadratic trends in affect progression are easier for partici-
pants to model when they are given a graph, rather than a 7-point scale.
To address this concern, we conducted a study in which participants
1164 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on November 28, 2010psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Finkenauer et al. / INVESTIGATING TIME IN FORECASTING 1165
were asked to imagine taking their driver’s exam. In the scale condition,
participants rated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) how
happy (disappointed) they would be if they passed (failed) the exam,
immediately after the exam, 1 day after the exam, 2 days after the
exam, 3 days after the exam, 4 days after the exam, and 5 days after the
exam, respectively. In the graph condition, participants were presented
with a graph depicting a grid of 7 cm high and 10.5 cm long. Gridlines
were visible every 0.5 cm. On the y-axis, the intensity of the emotion
was marked on a 7-point scale at every full centimeter (1 = not at all
happy [disappointed], 7 = very happy [disappointed]). On the x-axis,
forecasting distance was marked at every full centimeter (immediately,
1 day, 2 days, 3 days, 4 days, and 5 days). The order with which emo-
tions were forecasted was counterbalanced. Results indicated that scale
and graph forecasts yielded linear forecasts for both happiness and dis-
appointment over time. The only difference that emerged was that par-
ticipants in the scale condition forecasted slightly more intense
happiness for 4 and 5 days after the exam. No other effects emerged.
Importantly, no differences for linear or quadratic trends emerged, indi-
cating that differences found between affective forecasts and experi-
ences reflect actual differences that cannot be reduced to the type of
measurement tool used to assess them.
3. Following common practice (Grissom & Kim, 2005), we report
effect sizes for main effects and interactions expressed in terms of par-
tial eta-squared (pη2). For contrasts and trend analysis, we report the
effect sizes as correlations (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000).
Among the possible correlation effect size indexes available, we used
the partial correlation effect size (rcontrast in Rosenthal et al., 2000)
because of its straightforward interpretation in repeated measure
designs (the ratio between SS explained and error SS) and because of
its direct relationship with the partial eta-squared (i.e., r2 = pη2).
4. As a consequence of the difference in the models, the estimates
of the effects in the second model and the statistical tests may differ
from the first model, even when involving the same measures.
5. This test is simply the effect of day of forecast (–D5, –D4, –D3,
–D2, –D1) on the average forecasted disappointment.
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